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Abstract 
We analyze the impact of interim ranking on the risk taking and performance behaviour of 
professional athletes participating in international weightlifting competitions. Weightlifting 
competitions are multistage tournaments with the unique characteristic that the athletes must 
announce in advance the amount they intend to lift at each stage, thus allowing quantification of the 
riskiness of their choices. We present two key findings. First, risk taking exhibits an inverted-U 
relationship with rank: risk taking increases up to rank six, but athletes then revert to safer strategies 
towards the bottom of the ranking. Second, athletes systematically underperform when ranked closer 
to the top, despite higher incentives to perform well. An athlete is more than 30 percent less likely to 
lift the announced weight when ranked first than tenth. Athletes also underperform in relatively more 
prestigious competitions, when the competition is more intense, and when the potential gain from a 
successful lift is higher. Taken together, these findings suggest that athletes may systematically 
“choke under pressure”. 
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1. Introduction  
Individuals competing in tournaments are rewarded on the basis of their relative, rather than 
absolute, performance. Many everyday fields of economic activity are characterized by such a 
tournament-like structure. Employees and managers in labor markets, for example, are often 
evaluated on the basis of their relative performance within a firm; in financial markets, mutual 
funds compete in attracting new funds on the basis of their relative performance; in product 
markets, companies compete in patent races to secure the rights to new products; and, of course, 
the majority of sporting events are organized as tournaments.  
An extensive literature emphasizes the role of tournaments in realigning the incentives of the 
parties involved (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). 
For instance, in the labor market, a tournament among managers could provide incentive for 
improved effort resulting in higher performance, thus mitigating the typical inefficiencies caused 
by the conflicting objectives of managers and shareholders. 
However, it is likely that tournaments affect not only choices concerning effort, but other 
aspects of individual behavior as well, including risk taking and performance under pressure. In 
addition, tournaments often require the same pool of competitors to interact repeatedly over time, 
and are typically organized in stages. Tournaments may thus have a different effect on 
competitors who are leading the competition and those lagging behind. Exactly how interim 
ranking affects agents’ risk taking behavior and performance is still an open question, 
fundamental to our understanding of tournaments in labor, financial and product markets.  
An important branch of research is devoted to understanding how the behavior of individuals 
is affected by tournaments (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; 
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) and other performance evaluation schemes (Oyer, 1998; Lazear, 
2000; Courty and Marschke, 2004; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2007). However, there is little 
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evidence on the actual impact of interim ranking in tournaments on risk taking and performance. 
One reason is that it is typically difficult to observe both the amount of risk chosen by 
competitors and their performance.  
This paper is the first attempt to describe how both variables are simultaneously affected by 
interim rank position. It exploits an unusually rich panel dataset, with individual level 
information on professional athletes participating repeatedly in tournaments with very significant 
rewards. The data derives from weightlifting competitions. These are multistage tournaments 
with the unique characteristic that the athletes must publically announce in advance the amount 
they intend to lift at each stage. Access to these recorded announcements, together with 
information on whether the lift was successful or not, affords a unique opportunity to observe 
both the intentions and the performance of all participants.  
Using a panel dataset containing round-by-round information from international 
championships (the Olympic Games, World Championships and European Championships) 
between 1990 and 2006, we semi-parametrically estimate the impact of interim ranking on the 
announced weights and the probability of a successful lift. Since what matters for the individual 
score is the amount successfully lifted (more details are given in Section 2), not the announced 
weight, higher announcements represent a riskier strategy, in the sense that they imply a larger 
difference between the outcome in case of success and failure. Therefore, the relation between 
rank and announcement is informative of athletes’ risk-taking behavior. 
The probability that an athlete will succeed in lifting the declared weight during a specific 
attempt is much less than one. Obviously, better athletes are more likely to succeed in lifting a 
given weight, but the outcome of a specific attempt is still unpredictable to a certain extent. 
Interim ranking within a competition is affected by this random component of performance and 
is very volatile. Even the best athletes may find themselves at the bottom of the ranking in a 
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certain competition, due to a combination of their own bad luck and the success of their 
opponents. This variability of interim ranking during weightlifting competitions provides us with 
an ideal environment for observing how athletes react when in the lead or when tailing other 
competitors. The panel dimension of the data allows us to control for multiple sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity at the athlete, competition and year level. The multistage nature of the 
games even allows us to estimate specifications where we can control for joint athlete-
competition-year fixed effects.  
We present two key results. First, when lagging behind, competitors tend to take greater risks 
than those in the lead. However, risk-taking exhibits an inverted-U relationship with rank: 
announcements increase from first to sixth place, but decrease for further decreases in rank; after 
rank seventeen, athletes do not show significant differences relative to when ranked first. This 
implies that athletes initially choose riskier strategies for positions close enough to the top, 
reverting to progressively safer strategies when placed further down.  
The magnitude of the impact of rank is significant. A shift from first to sixth place 
corresponds to an increase in announcement that is 28 percent of the average increase in 
announcement between two stages, or 51 percent of the average discretionary (not dictated by 
the rules of the game) increase in announcement (see Section 2 for a description of the rules). 
This implies that cumulatively, by the end of the competition, an athlete is announcing roughly 
5Kg more, implying a drop in the likelihood of success of 9.1 percent. 
Our second key result is that, on average, the probability of a successful lift (conditional on 
the chosen weight) significantly increases moving down in the ranking. An athlete in sixth place 
is 19 percent more likely to lift the declared weight than when he is ranked first. An athlete in 
tenth position is 30 percent more likely to do so. Overall, the effect of rank on performance is so 
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large that a decrease in rank implies an overall increase in the probability of success, even after 
taking into account the possibility of higher announcements.  
This effect of ranking is surprising. One possible explanation is that athletes exert less effort 
when ranked at the top. However, since rewards are decreasing at a decreasing rate going down 
in the ranking, one would generally expect athletes to be more motivated and to exert greater 
effort when ranked at the top, where the gain from an increase in rank is highest. Therefore, one 
would expect that the probability of lifting a given weight would increase, not decrease, when an 
athlete is ranked closer to the top.
4
 
An alternative explanation for these results is that athletes perform badly under pressure, 
despite strong motivation and effort. This interpretation is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
that athletes’ performance may deteriorate as the importance of a successful lift increases, or 
when there are strong expectations for an outstanding performance. This may be due to “choking 
under pressure”, a phenomenon that has been analyzed extensively in the social psychology 
literature, but which has received little attention in economics (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein and 
Mazar, 2005; Dohmen, 2008). Several sources of pressure have been proposed by social 
psychologists, including the magnitude of stakes or rewards to be gained (Baumeister, 1985), and 
the presence of other people, whether they are competitors or not (Zajonc, 1965; Baumeister, 
Hamilton and Tice, 1985). 
The psychological literature suggests at least two reasons for why choking may occur in our 
setting. First, there may be an optimal level of arousal for performing a given task, beyond which 
increasing incentives may cause excessive motivation and result in poorer performance (Yerkes 
and Dodson, 1908). Second, increased pressure may make people unconsciously switch from 
automatic to controlled mental processes, in spite of the fact that automatic processes provide 
                                                 
4 The positive relation between rewards, motivation and effort seems to be accepted in the literature (Prendergast 1999), although 
with some exceptions (Camerer, Babcock, Lowenstein and Thaler, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a and 2000b; Frey and 
Jegen, 2001; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). 
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higher performance for some types of highly rehearsed tasks (Baumeister, 1985). Sports – like 
weightlifting – involving repetition of the same actions are typical cases of such tasks.5 These 
considerations directly apply to weightlifting, since the movements required to lift the bar (in 
both snatch and clean & jerk) are codified by the rules of the game, and athletes cannot change 
the technique used to lift the bar. 
The fact that performance decreases for rank positions closer to the top is robust when 
estimated for different types of competitions, different subsets of athletes, or by using different 
estimation strategies (OLS, fixed effects logit, IV). It is also robust when we control for the 
intensity of competition during a game, or the potential gains from a successful lift. In line with 
the hypothesis that individuals perform badly under pressure, we show that the individual 
probability of failing to lift a given weight is higher in more prestigious competitions, such as the 
Olympic Games or the World Championships, than in the European Championships. This is in 
spite of the fact that more prestigious competitions provide larger rewards, and are therefore 
expected to provide incentives to exert more effort.
6
 Second, performance decreases when the 
competition is more intense, in the sense that athletes have very similar interim scores, and when 
the potential gain in rank from a successful lift is higher. This is true although one would 
generally expect higher effort and higher performance when the potential gains from success are 
higher (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990). We find no evidence that “experience” (having won a 
medal or participated enough times in international competitions) attenuates this effect.  
Finally, we contribute to the broader debate on tournaments by measuring the impact of a 
counterfactual reward system, in which each athlete is rewarded at each stage in proportion to the 
amount successfully lifted. This counterfactual corresponds to the common situation in the labor 
                                                 
5 Another example of a repetitive task is free-throw shooting in basketball. Dandy, Brewer, and Tottman (2001) provide some 
evidence that free-throw shooting performance among elite Australian basketball players was worse during games than during 
training. 
6 The higher rewards also affect risk taking behavior. Athletes in prestigious competitions take significantly more risks by 
announcing higher weights.  
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market in which workers are paid in proportion to their absolute performance (piece-rate 
contract). The tournament setting significantly increases risk taking: the announced weight 
increases by 18 percent, while the probability of a successful lift decreases by 39 percent. 
Compared with a linear reward system, the average amount successfully lifted during each 
attempt is substantially lower in the tournament.  
Related literature 
Our work is related to a growing empirical literature on tournaments. Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno (1990) and Becker and Huselid (1992) use data from golf tournaments and car racing 
respectively to study whether larger prizes lead to greater effort and therefore improve 
performance. Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993), Eriksson (1996), and Conyon and Peck (1997) 
study corporate tournaments and executive compensation. Our research is also related to a small 
number of papers that examine agents’ risk taking decisions in tournaments. Becker and Huselid 
(1992) show that drivers take more risks if prizes and prize spreads are large. Knoeber and 
Thurman (1994) document that broiler chicken farmers least likely to win the tournament in 
which they were involved displayed more volatile performance, which is consistent with lower-
ranking competitors taking riskier strategies. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997) show that mutual funds with relatively low mid-year performance increase 
fund volatility, relative to the funds with relatively high mid-year performance. Finally, in a 
study of soccer matches, Grund and Gurtler (2005) find evidence that losing teams are more 
likely to make a risky substitution (e.g., replacing a defensive player with an offensive one). 
Three key aspects distinguish our work from these earlier studies. First, our unique setting 
permits us to observe both the intentions and performance of athletes, letting us isolate risk 
taking from other factors affecting performance. Second, we focus on an explicit, multi-agent, 
multi-stage tournament to investigate how interim ranking affects both risk taking and 
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performance. Third, we use an exceptionally rich panel dataset that allows us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in great detail. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the structure 
and rules of weightlifting competitions and the data. Section 3 presents our identification strategy 
and the econometric framework. Section 4 reports our main results and robustness tests. Section 
5 draws comparisons from a counterfactual reward system, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. A brief overview of weight lifting competitions and the data 
In weightlifting, competitors attempt to lift heavy weights mounted on steel bars.
7
 Lifters 
perform two types of lifts - the snatch and the clean & jerk. In the snatch, they lift the bar to 
arm’s length above their head in one movement. In the clean & jerk, they lift the bar to their 
shoulders, stand up straight, and then jerk the bar to arm’s length above their head. Lifters are 
allowed six attempts, three for each type of lift.
8
 The competition is therefore organized in six 
stages. Before each stage, athletes announce how much they intend to lift by publicly writing 
their name and announcement on a roster. Then, competitors attempt their announced lift in 
increasing order, from the lightest to the heaviest weight. If they are unsuccessful at a particular 
weight, the athletes have the option of reattempting the same lift or trying a heavier one in the 
following stage. At the end of the competition, the highest snatch and the highest clean & jerk 
successful lifts of each athlete are added to determine the final score. Athletes are then ranked by 
                                                 
7 Weightlifting has a long history as an Olympic discipline. Men’s weightlifting was on the program of the first modern Olympic 
Games in Athens in 1896, while the first contemporary World Championships took place in London in 1891. 
8 Two hours before the start of each game, competitors are weighed and assigned an official bodyweight. This then determines 
the weight category in which they will compete. There are eight categories for men and seven for women. Athletes may switch 
between different categories over the course of their athletic careers for both personal and strategic reasons (for example, if there 
are fewer competitors in a specific category). For this reason, our definition of a competitor throughout this paper is an athlete in 
a particular bodyweight category. An athlete’s bodyweight also plays a role in the event of two athletes lifting exactly the same 
weight; in this case, the competitor with the lower bodyweight who wins.  
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score with the highest score corresponding to rank one. In addition, at the end of each stage, 
interim rankings are computed using the same procedure.9 
The direct money prizes for weightlifting are awarded to the best athletes, with a convex 
relationship between rank and prizes particularly at the top. The first three athletes are awarded 
medals (gold, silver, bronze) and receive most of the media coverage. Gold medallists receive 
the lion’s share of fame and recognition, and private sponsorships are offered mainly to medal-
winners. In comparison to other sports (such as tennis or golf), the direct money prizes in 
weightlifting are small, even for the most prestigious competitions. However, national teams 
provide substantial monetary rewards and other benefits such as civil service jobs, or 
employment in the national sport federation to athletes winning medals in international 
competitions.10  
In addition to such private rewards, the top twenty-five athletes receive points for their 
national teams’ classification. The allocation of these points is non-linear for the top three 
positions (the first athlete receives twenty-eight points, the second twenty-five and the third 
twenty-three), after which it becomes linear. Overall, the coaches and players we interviewed 
concur that there is a very significant drop in rewards between getting a medal and not getting 
one. In addition, there is a consensus that rewards generally decrease at a decreasing rate moving 
down in the ranking. Only after rank twenty-five does the perception of significant differences in 
the return from a marginal change in rank wane.
11
  
Comprehensive round-by-round performance data for all athletes that participated in the most 
well-known weightlifting competitions (the Olympic Games, World Championships and 
                                                 
9 For the second and third stage, the interim rank is computed using only the best successful lift in snatch. 
10 Based on the existing evidence on the money prizes offered to 2008 Olympic Games medallists, for example, the difference 
between prizes for third and fourth place was €70,000 for Greece and China (Grohmann, 2008) and €40,000 for Taiwan (official 
figures from the national sport federations). This includes only monetary rewards given by national institutions, leaving out any 
additional benefit (such as civil service jobs and free housing), which may also be offered by some countries, such as Greece, 
Italy and Russia, in addition to monetary rewards, or private sponsorships, which can be the main source of income for 
medallists. 
11 In the empirical section that follows, we do not attempt to directly measure the monetary gains from a change in rank. Instead, 
we take a nonparametric approach and estimate the impact of rank on announcements and performance. 
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European Championships) from 1990 to 2006 were obtained from the International Weightlifting 
Database, yielding a total of more than 39,000 individual stage-specific observations. This panel 
consists of 2,768 athletes of both genders from 139 countries, participating in 37 weight 
categories, in international competitions held in 20 different countries. The unit of observation 
includes the type of competition, date, location, gender, weight category, athlete’s name, country 
of origin, bodyweight and detailed round-by-round attempts and outcomes, together with the 
overall rank at the end of the competition, as well as at the end of snatch and clean & jerk lifts.  
Using this information, we reconstructed the ranking of all athletes at each stage of the 
competition.
12
 Table 1 provides summary statistics on announcement and frequency of 
successful lifts. The average announcement increases from one stage to the next by roughly 
3Kg.13 The frequency of successful lifts correspondingly falls by around 20 percent. In general, 
higher weights can be lifted in the clean and jerk, as reflected in the higher average 
announcements.  
 
3. Empirical Framework  
We characterize each athlete’s ability as a risk-reward frontier that describes the relationship 
between the announced weight and probability of success. For each athlete this frontier is 
downward sloping, since the probability of a successful lift naturally decreases as the 
announcement increases. Higher announcements increase the score difference between success 
and failure, and thus imply riskier strategies.
14
 
                                                 
12 Our algorithm to reconstruct ranking was based on the official rules of the International Weightlifting Federation. We verified 
the results from our algorithm against the ranking information at the end of both snatch and clean & jerk, as well as the final 
overall ranking.  
13 After a successful attempt, athletes are required to increase their announcements by 1 Kg. 
14 The interpretation of the results is the same if one considers the variance in outcomes, instead of the absolute difference. For 
realistic values of the announcement and the success probability, increases in announcement also correspond to increases in the 
(weighted) variance of outcomes. 
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Figure 1 plots the risk-reward frontiers for two hypothetical athletes of different abilities. The 
better athlete is characterized by the frontier on the right. Each competitor can improve the 
probability of a successful lift by increasing the quality and intensity of training before the 
competition, or by achieving greater concentration/determination during the game (i.e., by 
exerting more effort). Therefore, we can reinterpret the difference between the two curves as the 
impact of effort. Effort, however, is not the only potential explanation for shifts in the frontier. 
Any variable affecting performance, including psychological pressure, fear or emotions in 
general, may shift the frontier in the same way.  
At each round, athletes choose their announcement, measured on the horizontal axis in Figure 
1. This choice entails a fundamental trade-off between the gains from a higher successful lift and 
the costs of a higher probability of failing. In other words, for any given athlete, a higher 
announcement implies a higher probability of failure along with a higher reward for success, and 
a larger difference between the payoffs for success and failure. In this sense, for any given risk-
reward frontier, a higher announcement implies that the athlete is pursuing a riskier strategy. 
In the next section, we first estimate the impact of interim ranking on the choice of 
announcement and on how characteristics of the individual and the type of competition affect 
this choice. In terms of Figure 1, our estimates will demonstrate how ranking affects the choice 
of a point on each athlete’s risk-reward frontier. We also estimate the risk-reward frontier, that is, 
the probability of a given individual successfully lifting the announced weight, and how this is 
affected by ranking and individual and competition characteristics. In terms of Figure 1, our 
estimates will demonstrate how ranking affects the location of each athlete’s risk-reward frontier.  
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3.1. The Determinants of Announcements 
We estimate models of the following general form: 
Announcementitjs = α0 +Xitj β + Σn θn Rank(n)itjs+ 
+ α1 Announcementitj(s-1) + α2 Successitj(s-1) + eitjs   (1) 
where Announcementitjs is the announcement of athlete i, in year t, in competition type j (a 
competition is classified as Olympic Game, World or European Championship), at stage s of the 
game (s=2,3,5,6)
15
; Xitj is a vector that includes characteristics of the individual (bodyweight, 
binary indicators for country of origin and whether competing in the home country) and of the 
competition (number of competitors), Rank(n)itjs is a binary indicator that takes the value of one 
if athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game is ranked n
th
 ; Successitj(s-1) is a 
binary indicator variable that takes the value of one if the previous attempt was successful; 
finally, the random variable eitjs captures all of the unobserved determinants of an announcement. 
Our main interest is on parameters θn that describe the impact on athletes’ announcement of 
being ranked n
th
.  
Cross-sectional estimates of (1) will likely produce biased estimates of all parameters, unless 
one is able to control for the athletes’ ability. For example, the quality of each athlete’s training 
may vary across years, or even for different competitions within the same year. Moreover, the 
organization of each competition may vary across years, and this may impact behavior. Hence, 
one needs to account for individual and competition-specific unobserved characteristics. 
To mitigate these problems, we exploit the panel structure of our data and include a rich set of 
fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The error term in (1) can be written as the 
sum of orthogonal athlete, year, competition, athlete-year, competition-year, athlete-competition, 
                                                 
15 We consider only four stages. The first stage of snatch is dropped because the interim ranking is not defined for the first stage. 
The first stage of clean & jerk is also dropped because the impact of previous announcement and success may be very different 
during the transition from one type of lift to the other. 
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athlete-year-competition components, and an idiosyncratic error term, capturing measurement 
error or random mistakes in the announcement decision  
e itjs = τi  + τt  + τj + τs + τit + τjt + τij + τitj + ε itjs       (2) 
In the next section, we will report results from alternative fixed effects specifications that 
include different combinations of these controls. Most importantly, due to the multi-stage nature 
of weightlifting competitions, we can include athlete-year-competition (τitj) fixed effects. In this 
case, our main parameters of interest, θn, are estimated only by exploiting the variability of 
ranking across stages of the same competition for a given individual.  
The variability of ranking, even for a given athlete within a given competition, is significant. 
On average, the difference between the maximum and minimum interim rank for a given 
individual within a competition is 6.4 positions, with the 25th percentile experiencing a change of 
3 positions and the 75th percentile experiencing a change of 8 ranks. In other words, the 
variability in ranking is such that even the most consistent weightlifters may oscillate, for 
example, between getting a gold and getting no medal at all.  
Our baseline specification includes a dummy for whether the previous announcement was 
successful or not, because the rules of the game dictate a minimum increase after a successful 
attempt. The level of the previous announcement is also included, as we want to allow for 
decreasing increments as the absolute level of the announced weight increases.
16
 
Model (1) can be estimated by OLS under the assumption that E(εitjs| Xitj, Rank(n)itjs, 
Announcementitj(s-1), Successitj(s-1) , τitj)=0. This condition requires ε to be serially uncorrelated 
and that the control variables and fixed effects fully capture all strategic aspects of the game. The 
                                                 
16 Including these two parameters means that the rank coefficients, θn, capture the impact of rank on athletes’ discretionary 
incremental announcement. As the minimum increment after a successful attempt is 1 Kg, one could rewrite model (1) as 
follows: 
Announcementitjs = [Announcementitj(s-1) +Successitj(s-1)]+[a0 +Xitj β + Σn θn Rank(n)itjs+ a1 Announcementitj(s-1) +a2Successitj(s-1) 
+e itjs],  
where the first bracket is the automatic announcement, dictated by the rules of the game, and the second is the discretionary 
announcement, capturing athletes’ risk taking behavior. The parameter α1 and α2 in model (1) capture the joint effect on both the 
automatic and the discretionary announcement (α1=1+a1; α2=1+a2).  
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concern, for example, could be that a higher concentration of athletes with very similar 
performance may affect an individual’s behavior. Similarly, the absolute distance from the 
closest athletes (following or proceeding) in the ranking may also make a difference. Risk taking 
may be more rewarding if an athlete leads the closest trailer by a relatively substantial amount, 
but trails the closest leader by relatively little. We explore these issues in our robustness analysis. 
None of our benchmark results change in any fundamental way. 
 
3.2. The Determinants of Performance  
We estimate the risk-reward frontier using the following specification: 
Successitjs = Xitj γ + Σn δn Rank(n)itjs + Σs λs Announcementitjs + uitjs  (3) 
where Successitjs is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if athlete i, in year t, in 
competition j, at stage s (s =2,...,6) was successful in lifting the announced weight 
(Announcementitjs), Xitj is the same vector of individual and competition characteristics as 
before, Rank(n)itjs is the binary indicator for rank n, and uitjs is the error term that captures all 
unobserved determinants of a successful lift. Our main interest is in parameters δn that describe 
the impact of being ranked n
th
 on the probability of success, controlling for announcement. 
Notice, that in terms of Figure 1, the parameters λs describe the average slope of athletes’ risk-
reward frontier, while δn capture the average impact of rank on its level. 
We correct for unobserved heterogeneity by extensively controlling for fixed effects. In 
particular, the error term in (3) also can be decomposed as in (2): 
 uitjs = τi  + τt  + τj + τs + τit + τjt + τij + τitj + ηitjs       (4) 
where ηitjs describe the random component of performance. This random component allows 
for random errors by the athletes, or for unforeseen circumstances affecting the performance of 
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the athlete. We provide estimates of the parameters in (3) using a variety of fixed effects 
specifications, possibly including athlete-year-competition control variables.  
Under the assumptions that E(ηitjs | Xitj, Rank(n)itjs, Announcementitjs, τitj) =0, and that ηitjs are 
not serially correlated, we estimate (3) using a linear probability and a conditional (fixed-effects) 
logit model. Both estimation methods lead to very similar results.  
These assumptions imply that unobserved determinants of performance are not correlated 
with unobserved determinants for each announcement, Ε(ηitjs|εitjr)=0, for s,r =2,…,6. Τhe 
separation of the role of coaches and athletes, and the difference in timing of the announcements 
and actual lifts justify the validity of this assumption. Discussions with coaches and athletes 
indicated that athletes typically concentrate on successfully lifting the weight chosen by their 
coaches.
17 
Although coaches and athletes do communicate during the game, it is unlikely that the 
coach incorporates in the announcement decision the idiosyncratic effects captured by the error 
term ηitjs. Moreover, the variables captured by ηitjs are likely to be realized only during – or just 
before – the attempt, so they are unlikely to affect the announcement, which is made at the 
beginning of the stage.  
Variables such as individual physical and mental training before a given competition are 
captured by the athlete-competition fixed effects. The identity of competitors and the structure of 
rewards and any other variable which is fixed at the individual level, for a given competition, are 
also captured by these fixed effects. The shocks ηitjs may capture changes in the behavior of the 
public during the competition, or other events that occur during the competition and may affect 
the performance of the athletes. However, because of the separation of the role of the coach and 
the athlete, and because announcements are made well before the actual lifts, it is unlikely that in 
                                                 
17 Perhaps the most famous example of such behavior was Pyrros Dimas, a three-time Olympic champion and one of the best 
weightlifters in history, who reportedly did not want to know how many kilos his coach was choosing for him in each attempt. 
His motto was: “I will lift as many kilos as you are going to choose for me”. 
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practice such transitory variables could systematically affect the probability of success and the 
announcement. 
 
3.3 The determinants of performance: Endogeneity of announcement and alternative 
estimation strategies 
 
Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Estimation of model (3) may lead to inconsistent results if shocks to success at each stage of 
the competition (ηitjs) that go unobserved by the econometrician affect the announcement 
decision at that stage (Announcementitjs). Although it is highly unlikely that such shocks would 
systematically affect our estimates, we nevertheless also explore an instrumental variables 
approach that allows estimation of the parameters in (3) even if changes in the frontier impact the 
contemporaneous choice of the announcement, Ε(ηitjs|εitjs )≠0. 
18
 As instruments for current 
announcement we use the announcement made in the previous attempt and the lagged indicator 
variable for success (within a given style). On the one hand, these two variables are correlated 
with the current announcement through (1), which can be used to test the power of the 
instrument (the estimated results for model (1) can be interpreted as the first stage regression 
results). On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the previous announcement and 
success indicator may directly impact the probability of a successful lift in the current stage, after 
controlling for the current announcement. These considerations render the two variables valid 
instruments.  
Alternative estimation strategies 
We also provide two additional types of robustness results. First, we control for the 
announcement in model (3) using a less restrictive functional form. We divide the announcement 
into nine intervals based on the percentiles of its distribution and define a dummy for each 
                                                 
18 We hold the assumption that η and ε are serially uncorrelated. Notice, however, that we allow for correlation across stages 
because of the individual-year-competition fixed effects (τitj). 
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bracket. We then interact them with each stage indicator variable. In other words, instead of 
controlling for the announcement using a single linear coefficient for each stage of the 
competition, we allow for a more flexible piecewise function. 
Second, we explore the variability in ranking only for those athletes that reattempted to lift the 
same weight in two (or three) subsequent attempts. Remember that in case of a failed attempt, 
athletes can choose to reattempt the same weight. For those athletes, although their 
announcement is the same in two consecutive attempts, their interim ranking may decrease 
significantly as a result of their competitors’ performance. The added value of this exercise is 
that we do not need to control for their announcement, since it is constant at the individual level 
and it is captured by the athlete-competition-year specific fixed effect.19  Hence, results cannot 
be affected by assumptions on the functional form relating announcement to the probability of a 
successful lift.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Impact of Rank on Announcement 
Table 2 reports our benchmark results for model (1), using alternative fixed effects 
specifications.20 Column 1 provides the estimated coefficients when we control for athlete, year 
and competition fixed effects separately, whereas column 5 reports the estimates from our richest 
specification (including joint athlete-year-competition fixed effects). The omitted rank category 
throughout the table corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure 
the impact of being ranked n
th
 relative to being first.  
                                                 
19 If, during the same competition, an athlete attempts to lift two different weights twice, we include two individual specific fixed 
effects. 
20 Only the first ten rank coefficients are reported in this table together with the rest of the estimated variables to ease exposition. 
The table is reported in full in the Appendix (Table A1). Throughout the paper, we report robust standard errors clustered by 
athlete. 
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Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients and confidence interval on the thirty-five rank binary 
indicators from our most restrictive specifications in column 5. When lagging behind, 
competitors tend to adopt riskier strategies than those in the lead. However, risk-taking exhibits 
an inverted-U relationship with rank: announcements increase from first to sixth place, but then 
decrease for further decreases in rank until seventeenth place, after which there is no significant 
effect. This implies that athletes choose riskier strategies moving down in the ranking until rank 
six, but then progressively revert to safer strategies when ranked further down.  
An athlete ranked sixth would announce on average 0.825 Kg more than when ranked first, 
which is 28 percent of the average increase in announcement between two stages (see Table 1), 
or 51 percent of the average discretionary increase in announcement (not dictated by the rules of 
the game).21 This implies that cumulatively, by the end of the competition, an athlete announces 
roughly 5 Kg more, which implies a drop in the likelihood of success of 9.1 percent.
22
 This effect 
is substantial, given that the probability of a successful lift at the last attempt is just 32 percent 
(Table 1). In terms of Figure 1, athletes choose points further to the right on their risk-reward 
frontier, involving higher weights, but a lower probability of success. However, after rank six, 
individuals choose less risky strategies as they move down in the ranking. For example, the 
impact of going from rank six to eleven is 0.2 Kg. The relation between rank and announcement 
progressively flattens towards the bottom of the ranking.23 The results are very robust to the way 
we control for unobserved heterogeneity in Table 2.
24
 
Looking at the impact of athletes’ individual characteristics, being heavier (within a given 
category) implies higher announcements. This confirms a well-known fact in weightlifting that a 
                                                 
21 The average discretionary increase in announcement across all stages is 1.62Kg. 
22 The average impact of a 1 Kg increase in announcement on the probability of a successful lift is approximately 1.8 percent (see 
column 5, Table 3).  
23 The change in announcement between rank six and eighteen is 0.746Kg, but only 0.178Kg between rank nineteen and thirty-
four (difference highly significant: F(19, 4047)=5.87, prob>F=0.015). 
24 A similar inverted-U relationship emerges in column 2, where we control for athlete and competition-year fixed effects, in 
column 3, where we control for year and athlete-competition fixed effects and in column 4, where we control for competition and 
athlete-year fixed effects. Figure A1 in the appendix plots the estimated rank coefficients from all specifications. Overall, 
unobserved heterogeneity does not significantly affect the impact of rank on announcement.  
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higher body mass allows athletes’ to lift heavier weights. Playing at home does not seem to 
induce athletes to take greater risks, as the coefficient on Homeitj is never significant. The 
number of competitors has a positive, but very small effect on announcement.25 Finally, both the 
impact of the previous announcement and the success indicator are positive and significant as 
expected, as athletes cannot decrease their announcement and must increase it after a successful 
attempt. 
 
4.2 Interpretation of the impact of rank on announcement  
Conventional wisdom from sports competitions tells us that the trailing team may have a big 
incentive to adopt riskier strategies in an attempt to catch up with the leaders (Grund and Gurtler, 
2005). Similarly, it has been argued that troubled firms and interim losers in corporate 
tournaments are more likely to take riskier strategies than market leaders (Bowman, 1982; 
Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).
26
 
The fact that the impact of rank is positive up to rank seventeen is broadly consistent with this 
literature. 
The progressive flattening of the relation after the first six positions is also consistent with 
differences in risk taking behavior at different points in the ranking. Since rewards are 
decreasing at a decreasing rate going down in the ranking, the benefit from variability in rank is 
expected to decrease substantially towards the bottom of the ranking, where catching up with the 
leaders becomes progressively more unlikely. 
Some additional details further support the link between the results in Figure 2 and 
differences in risk-taking behavior at different rank positions. If changes in attitude towards risk 
drives the results in Figure 2, then we expect to observe particularly large differences between 
                                                 
25 Coefficients from columns 1 and 3 indicate that having ten additional participants implies an average increase of 0.06 Kg in 
announcements. 
26 This intuition has been formalized by Cabral (2003), Goriaev, Palomino and Prat (2003), and Anderson and Cabral (2007). 
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the announcements at ranks one and two. For while the leader has no gain from variability in 
rank, the second athlete may significantly gain from rank variability.27 We also expect to observe 
large differences between rank 3 and 4. In fact, prizes in weightlifting competitions display a 
significant discontinuity between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 rank (see Section 2). This provides incentives to take 
riskier strategies when ranked 4
th
 than when ranked 3
rd
.
28
 
We find strong support for these hypotheses: the coefficient for rank two is statistically 
different from zero at conventional levels (Table 2, column 5), and so is the difference in 
coefficients between rank three and four (F(1, 4047)=11.51, prob>F=0.0007). Moreover, the 
differences between rank one and two (0.309 Kg), and three and four (0.237 Kg), are not 
statistically significant (F(1, 4047)=0.43, prob>F=0.5145) and they are larger than any other 
difference between adjacent ranks.  
 
4.3 The Impact of Rank on the Probability of a Successful Lift  
Table 3 reports our benchmark results for model (3), using alternative fixed effects 
specifications.
29
 Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficients and confidence interval on the thirty-
five rank binary indicators from our most restrictive (athlete-year-competition fixed effects) 
linear probability model specification in column 5 to ease exposition. The omitted rank category 
again corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of 
being ranked n
th
 relative to being first.  
Estimated coefficients reveal a significant positive relationship between ranking and the 
probability of a successful lift. Conditional on the announced weight, moving an athlete from the 
first to the sixth position implies a 19 percent increase in the probability of a successful lift, and a 
                                                 
27 As discussed above, the relation between rewards and prizes is decreasing and convex. 
28 The discontinuity in rewards locally affects the concavity of the relation between rewards and rank, so that incentives to take 
risk are drastically different just above and below this threshold. 
29 To ease exposition, we report only the first ten rank coefficients. The table is reported in full in the Appendix (Table A2).  
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change from first to tenth implies a 32 percent increase. Overall, the effect of rank on 
performance is so large that a decrease in rank implies an overall increase in the probability of 
success, even after taking into account the possibility of higher announcements. 
Columns 1-4 in Table 3 report the results from the different fixed effects specifications. In 
sharp contrast to model (1), controlling for more sources of unobserved heterogeneity has a large 
impact on the results. Figure A2 in the Appendix plots the estimated rank coefficients from the 
different specifications. As we move from column 5 to column 1 in Table 3, we progressively 
control for fewer sources of unobserved heterogeneity and as a result, the relationship becomes 
flatter and not significant. This is consistent with an omitted variable bias. Individuals with 
higher unobserved ability are likely to be ranked towards the top, and they also perform better on 
average. When we do not control for individual characteristics, the rank variable captures the 
unobserved differences in quality, so the performance at the top of the ranking is overestimated. 
The bias induced by the omitted variable tends to offset the true impact of changes in rank.  
Results using the conditional (fixed-effects) logit model show the same positive relationship 
between rank and success. Column 6 of Table 3, reports the coefficients for our richest fixed 
effects specification. As in column 5, the impact of rank on the log-odds of a successful lift is 
significantly positive and increases as we move down in the ranking.  
The remaining estimated coefficients in Table 3 are in line with expectations. Higher 
bodyweight increases the probability of successfully lifting the announced weight (i.e., the 
individual frontier shifts to the right when bodyweight increases). Playing at home seems to 
provide a small (7 percent) but significant advantage in performance. On the contrary, an 
increase in the number of competitors seems to slightly decrease the probability of a successful 
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lift.
30
 Finally, announcements at each stage have a negative and significant coefficient, as higher 
announcements generally lead to a lower probability of success. 
IV regression results 
Using our most restrictive (athlete-competition-year fixed effects) linear specification, we re-
estimate model (3) using the lagged announcement and success indicator variable as instruments 
for the current announcement. Results are reported in Table 4. The first stage estimates of both 
instruments are positive and significant, confirming our previous results from model (1). Both 
the first stage R
2
 and F tests indicate that we do not have a weak instrument problem (Stock and 
Yogo 2005). The rank coefficients exhibit the same positive pattern as before: conditional on the 
announcement, an athlete lifts with higher probability if he is further down in the ranking. 
Alternative estimation strategies 
Table A3 in the Appendix reports the estimated rank coefficients for our richest specification 
(athlete-year-competition fixed effects), controlling for announcement at each stage using a 
flexible piecewise function (as described in Section 3.3). The rank coefficients exhibit the same 
positive pattern as before. 
Table A4 in the Appendix reports the results of model (3), only for those athletes that 
reattempted to lift the same weight in either style (as described in Section 3.3). We divide 
athletes into three categories: those who experienced a fall of up to two rank positions (56.03 
percent of the sample), those who experienced a fall between three and six positions (30.11 
percent) and those fell more than six ranks (13.85 percent). Using the first category as the base-
line category, coefficients on the remaining two indicators reveal the same qualitative picture as 
before: for exactly the same announcement, the more rank places an athlete drops, the higher is 
the probability of a successful lift.
 
 
 
                                                 
30 We explore the effect of the intensity of competition extensively in the next section. 
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4.4 Interpretation of the impact of rank on performance 
The results from model (3) imply that moving towards the top of the ranking decreases 
performance. There are two potential explanations for this surprising result. First, individuals 
exert less effort as they move towards the top of the ranking. Although the marginal increase in 
rewards from an increase in rank is higher at the top, one cannot exclude that effort might 
decrease. This could occur, for example, either because competition is systematically less intense 
at the top, or because the differences in interim score across athletes are higher, or because 
potential gains from a successful lift are lower. 
A second potential explanation is what is known in the social psychology literature as 
“choking under pressure”. Athletes’ performance may deteriorate when the stakes are higher, or 
the importance of success is higher (Baumeister, 1985), or when there is more pressure from 
other individuals, either friendly or not (Zajonc, 1965). At the top of the ranking stakes are 
higher and so is the importance of a successful lift, and the potential pressure created by the 
public and the media. This suggests that athletes in weightlifting competitions may perform 
worse when ranked closer to the top. The coaches we interviewed reported that it is expected for 
athletes to perform systematically better in training sessions than in competitions, which suggests 
that psychological pressure may indeed be important.  
The results in Figure 3 are consistent with both explanations. Ranking affects behavior, but 
one cannot identify whether the decrease in performance at the top comes from lower effort or 
choking under pressure, or a combination of both. However, there are circumstances in which the 
two theories make different predictions on the impact of ranking on performance and so we can 
try to explore the relative importance of the two possible explanations. In the remaining part of 
this section, we will first compare prestigious and non-prestigious competitions, and then 
situations in which athletes face more intense competition, or higher incentives to perform well.  
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Prestigious versus non-prestigious competitions 
The literature on tournaments suggests that effort (and therefore performance) increases with 
the level of prizes (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Becker and Huselid, 1992; Knoeber and 
Thurman, 1994). The literature on social psychology, however, argues that the psychological 
pressure caused by higher incentives (including monetary incentives), or the presence on an 
audience, may significantly decrease performance.  
Prizes (both monetary and not) and media coverage are higher for the Olympic Games and 
World Championship than for the European Championship. Therefore, athletes should perform 
better in the Olympic Games or World championships than in the European Championships 
(they should lift any given weight with a higher probability). Finding the contrary would suggest 
that psychological pressure may indeed play a significant role.  
To explore this hypothesis, we interact all explanatory variables (rank dummies, stage-
specific announcements and stage dummies) in model (3) with an indicator that takes the value 
of one if the competition is less prestigious (European Championships) and zero otherwise.
31
  
Table A5 in the Appendix reports the estimated rank coefficients for prestigious and non-
prestigious events, controlling for athlete-year fixed effects, which is the most restrictive 
specification we can use. The omitted rank category corresponds to first place in a non-
prestigious competition. In the first two columns of Table 5 we report the average impact of 
interim rank based on the estimated coefficients in Table A5, column 1, and the average 
announcements at each stage.
32
 Figure 4 describes the differences in the impact of interim rank in 
prestigious and non-prestigious competitions.  
                                                 
31 The European Championships takes place every year, whereas the World Championships alternate with the Olympic Games, 
taking place every four years. So there are many instances in which the same athlete can participate in both types of competitions 
during a single year. See table B1 in the Appendix for the exact chronology of competitions in our sample. 
32 Define the indicator variable P equal to one for prestigious competitions. Table 5 reports δn
P
 Rank(n) + (1/5)Σs 
(λs
PAnnouncement*s+τs
P) for each rank n, both for prestigious (P=1) and non-prestigious competitions (P=0), where 
Announcement*s is the average announcement for stage s and τs
P is the estimated stage-specific coefficient.  
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For a given announced weight, performance is significantly lower in more prestigious 
competitions (F(20, 4051)=206.48, P-value=0.0000). The average difference in the level of the 
two curves is 12 percent, whereas there is no statistically significant difference in the slope of the 
two curves. This is consistent with the impact of increased pressure dominating the increase in 
effort in important competitions. The fact that both curves in Figure 4 are upward sloping shows 
that our previous findings are robust. In both types of competitions the marginal impact of rank 
is essentially the same. 
Although the European and World Championships (or Olympic Games) do not overlap within 
a year, one could possibly argue that the difference just identified is entirely driven by self-
selection of good athletes to the more prestigious competitions. To control for this potential 
selection problem, we re-estimate the same model, this time restricting the sample to those 
athletes who participated in both competitions in the same year (Table A5, column 2).
33
 The 
results are substantially unaffected (Table 5, columns 3 and 4), although the average distance 
between the two curves is slightly smaller (8 percent).
34
 
The effect of intensity of competition 
As argued above, if effort is lower when competition is less intense, and competition is 
systematically less intense at the top of the ranking, then performance may be decreasing moving 
towards the top of the ranking, even in the absence of psychological pressure. This hypothesis 
suggests carefully controlling for intensity of the competition in model (3).
35
 
We construct a measure of the intensity of the competition which varies at the individual level 
within a competition. Given the interim score sitjs of athlete i, in year t, competition j, and stage s, 
                                                 
33 None of the results changes in any fundamental way if we use a fixed effect logit model (columns 3 and 4 in Table A5). 
34 We also estimate the impact of ranking on risk taking, model (1) discussed above, interacting the prestigious binary indicator 
with all the explanatory variables (columns 5 and 6 in Table A5). The inverted U-shape relationship between risk taking and rank 
is not affected. However, announcements are higher overall in more prestigious competitions, particularly after rank 10, 
suggesting that when incentives are higher athletes tend to choose more risky strategies on average (total effects not reported 
here, available upon request). 
35 The literature suggests that effort (and therefore performance) may be affected by the intensity of competition (Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno, 1990). 
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we compute the fraction of other athletes k≠i with interim score sktjs such that (sitjs-10)≤ sktjs < 
(sitjs+10).
36 The fraction of competitors within this interval varies across individuals and across 
stages of the same competition, because of differences in the distribution of interim scores. We 
then construct a binary indicator for tough competitions, which is equal to one when our measure 
of intensity of the competition is above 30 percent.
37
 
We first estimated model (3) including this variable including athlete-year-competition fixed 
effects. The impact of this variable is negative and significant (coef. -0.262, s.e. 0.031), implying 
lower performance when competition is more intense. The impact of rank on performance is not 
affected, providing additional evidence that performance decreases when athletes are ranked 
closer to the top.  
Second, we interact the binary indicator for tough competition with all the explanatory 
variables in model (3) while controlling for athlete-year-competition fixed effects. Table 6 
presents the impact of interim rank based on these estimates and the average announcement at 
each stage (estimated coefficients are reported in Table A6 of the Appendix).
38
 The omitted rank 
category now corresponds to rank one when the competition is not close. The probability of a 
successful lift is significantly lower when the competition is tough for any interim rank (F(19, 
4051)=3.39, prob>F=0.0000).  
These findings show that controlling for intensity of the competition does not eliminate the 
positive impact of rank on performance, and that performance is overall lower when competition 
is more intense. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the negative effect of increased psychological 
pressure may dominate any positive effect of higher effort when competition is more intense.  
                                                 
36 As discussed above, interim scores are computed as the sum of the maximum successful lift in snatch and clean & jerk up to 
that stage. 
37 On average, the fraction of competitors within the 10Kg interval is twenty-six percent, with a median of twenty-four percent. 
So the thirty percent cut-off level captures the behaviour of athletes facing relatively high concentrations of competitors around 
them. Results are robust to changes in either the radius around an athlete or the cut-off level that we use. 
38 Define the indicator variable Titjs if competition is tough for individual i, in year t, competition j and stage s. Table 6 reports δn
T
 
Rank(n) + (1/5)Σs (λs
TAnnouncement*s+τs
T) for each rank n, when the competition is tough (T=1) and non-tough (T=0), where 
Announcement*s is the average announcement for stage s, and τs
T is the estimated stage-specific coefficient. 
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The potential gains from a successful lift 
Finally, one could argue that the impact of rank in Figure 3 is due to higher potential gains 
from success at the bottom of the ranking. In other words, for a given announcement, the 
potential gain in rank from a successful lift may increase moving towards the bottom of the 
ranking.  
For each announcement in the dataset, we compute the potential improvement in rank position 
in case of success, given the observed performance of all the other competitors. While there is a 
slight increase in potential gains as one moves towards the bottom of the ranking, the potential 
gain in rank is on average small (1.6 rank positions). At rank 10, for example, the average gain in 
case of success is less than 1, at rank 20 it is 3.4, while at rank 35 it is 10.3 rank positions. This 
implies that, on average, individuals at the bottom of the interim ranking are extremely unlikely 
to reach the top positions, and be awarded significant prizes.  
When we include our measure of potential gains in model (3), the results on the impact of 
rank on performance are not affected. The impact of this additional variable is negative and 
significant (coef. -0.016, s.e. 0.002), suggesting that performance is lower when the potential 
gain from success is higher. We also interact potential gain with all the rank dummies, so that we 
can estimate the local impact of potential gain for each rank position. Our main results are not 
affected, and the impact of potential gain is either negative or not statistically significant for all 
rank positions.
39
 
 
5. The impact of tournament incentives relative to a linear reward scheme 
Based on our results, we now consider the counterfactual scenario in which prizes are 
assigned stage-by-stage, as a linear function of the weight lifted at each stage, with no rewards 
                                                 
39 Results not reported here, available upon request. Note that since these effects are local, the fact that we do not observe the 
exact money prizes for each rank position is not a significant limitation. 
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based on relative performance. This counterfactual scenario provides a useful benchmark for our 
tournament setting, as it corresponds to a simple piece-rate contract as is commonly used by 
firms to reward employees, especially when the tasks involved are simple and repetitive.40 
The linear reward scheme applied in our setting implies that a risk neutral athlete would 
attempt to maximize the expected weight successfully lifted at each stage. In this scenario, given 
the individual risk-reward frontier, athletes would make announcements such that the elasticity 
of the probability of a successful lift to the announcement is equal to one.  
Given the estimated risk reward frontier in model (3), we find that the elasticity implied by 
the data (measured at the averages) varies between -3 and -10, as reported in Table 7.
41
 This 
implies that, by decreasing the announcement by one percent, athletes would increase the 
probability of a successful lift between 3 and 10 percent. Doing so would significantly increase 
their counterfactual payment on average. In particular, in order to maximize the expected weight 
successfully lifted at each stage, athletes would make 15 to 21 percent smaller announcements, 
implying an increase in the probability of a successful lift between 12 and 60 percent.  
Figure 5 describes the counterfactual choice of announcement for a hypothetical individual 
with average announcement (154.8 Kg) and an average probability of a successful lift (0.56), in 
the second clean & jerk attempt. Under the counterfactual system, our hypothetical athlete would 
announce only 131.4 Kg and move up on his frontier, increasing the probability of a successful 
lift to 0.92 (point B in Figure 7).  
Note that our counterfactual analysis illustrates only part of the possible impact of moving 
from a tournament to a linear reward system. If the linear compensation scheme puts less 
pressure on participants, average performance may further increase in the linear reward system. 
 
                                                 
40 This is also the benchmark case used by Lazear and Rosen (1981) to discuss the impact of tournaments. 
41 The elasticity is computed as [dPr(Successful lift)/dAnnouncement]/[Average Announcement/Average Pr(Successful lift)]. 
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6. Additional results and discussion 
We present four additional results. We first discuss the impact of (i) prestige and (ii) intensity 
of the competition on risk taking behavior. Then, we show that (iii) tiredness cannot reasonably 
explain the observed relation between rank and performance, and finally that (iv) this relation is 
not significantly affected by athletes’ experience.  
Risk taking and absolute distance from competitors 
The results in Figure 2 are not affected when we control for the difference in score between 
each competitor and the competitor just above and below in the interim ranking. We would 
expect athletes to take more risks and increase their announcement in an attempt to overtake their 
competitor, if they are relatively close to the athlete just above them, but relatively far from the 
competitor just below in the interim rank. On the contrary, we would expect athletes to reduce 
risk taking and try to defend their position if they are relatively far from the competitor just 
above, but close to the competitor below in the interim rank.  
We compute for each observation the score distance between each athlete and the athletes 
ranked just above and below. We then classify each observation in one of four categories and 
define four corresponding indicator variables: FF when a given athlete is far from both the 
athletes leading and following (1.17 percent of the observations); FC when a given athlete is far 
from the athlete following but close to the athlete leading (5.64 percent); CF in the opposite case 
(4.46 percent); and finally CC when both are close (88.72 percent).
42
 We then use CC as the base 
line category, and include the remaining three indicators in model (1). Results are reported in 
Table A7 of the Appendix. Announcement is 0.2 kg higher in the FC case relative to the baseline 
category, 0.2 Kg lower in the CF case, and not significantly different in the FF case. The impact 
of distance from the competitor on announcement is in line with the incentives to take risk 
                                                 
42 We classify two athletes being far if their interim scores’ distance is higher than the ninety-fifth percentile of the distribution of 
distances in that particular stage. We also experimented using the ninetieth or the seventy-fifth percentile as the cut-off. Our 
results qualitatively remain the same.   
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discussed in the literature (Bronars and Oettinger, 2001). This further supports the relation 
between announcement decision and risk taking behavior. 
Risk taking and intensity of competition 
One concern could be that a higher concentration of athletes with similar performance might 
affect individuals’ risk attitude. Table A8 in the Appendix reports the results from model (1) 
when we add the binary indicator for close competitions described in Section 4.4. Its coefficient 
is negative but not significant, and the results in Figure 2 are not affected.
43
 
The impact of tiredness on performance 
An alternative explanation for the positive relationship between rank and performance in 
Figure 3 is tiredness. One may argue that athletes at the top of the ranking may be more fatigued, 
having successfully lifted heavier weights, and so their performance may decrease in subsequent 
attempts. 
We find this explanation unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, it is not obvious that a 
failed attempt is more tiring than a successful one. So it is not necessarily true that athletes are 
more tired when ranked at the top (since an athlete may be ranked at the bottom after a series of 
ambitious- yet unsuccessful- attempts). Second, we estimate model (3) using athlete-year-
competition fixed effects and controlling for the cumulative weight attempted up to that stage in 
the competition. The impact of cumulative weight is negative but very small, and statistically 
insignificant.
44
 The results in Figure 3 are virtually unchanged. Finally, tiredness cannot possibly 
explain why the same positive relationship between rank and success exists when we restrict our 
sample to athletes reattempting the same weight. By definition athletes are more tired in their 
                                                 
43 We also experimented by interacting the tough competition indicator with all the rank dummies and the rest of variables in 
model (1). The results were unchanged. Both sets of rank coefficients exhibited the inverted-U relationship and were statistically 
indistinguishable. 
44 The point estimate is. -0.00010, with s.e. 0.0006. This implies that a 10 Kg increase in weight affects the probability of a 
successful lift by just 0.1 percent.  
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second attempt (and their interim ranking cannot be higher), but performance significantly 
increases.  
Experience and the impact of rank on performance 
We finally investigate whether experience attenuates the impact of rank on performance. 
Experience has been shown to mitigate the endowment effect in field experiments (List, 2003). 
In laboratory experiments on the ultimatum game, Slonim and Roth (1998) find that experience 
attenuates the tendency of experimental subjects to reject low offers, and increases the frequency 
of low proposals. To the extent that the results in Figure 3 may be related to psychological 
pressure, it is interesting to see if experience attenuates the impact of rank.  
To measure “experience” in our setting, we construct a binary indicator that takes the value of 
one if an athlete has previously won a medal in an international competition. This definition 
captures the fact that winning a medal may provide a learning opportunity about what it takes to 
perform under pressure. We then interact this indicator with all the explanatory variables in 
model (3) while controlling for athlete-year-competition fixed effects. Table 8 reports the 
estimated coefficients. The relationship between rank and performance is upward sloping for 
both experienced and inexperienced athletes, and the two curves are not significantly different. 
Results are qualitatively the same if we use alternative definitions for experience, such as the 
times an athlete has participated in a given competition (or in any competition).45  
 
7. Conclusions 
Professional athletes participating in international weightlifting competitions seem to take 
more risks when ranked “close enough” to the first athlete (the first seventeen positions), but 
                                                 
45 List (2003) defines an individual as experienced if the number of previous market transactions is above a given threshold. In 
our case, a similar definition is whether an athlete has previously participated in at least n competitions, where n is some 
percentile of the distribution of the number of competitions in which athletes participated. Results not reported here, available 
upon request. 
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then revert to safer strategies when ranked lower. This result is in line with the intuition that 
laggards may increase risk taking in an effort to catch up with the leaders. However, conditional 
on the weight chosen, the probability of success decreases as we get closer to the top. This result 
is quite surprising and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity (across competitors or 
competitions), variability in the intensity of the competition, or differences in the return to effort, 
and is robust across a number of alternative specifications and estimation strategies. We provide 
some evidence suggesting that this effect could be the result of psychological pressure. This may 
explain why coping with pressure is often mentioned as an important skill for managers in large 
organizations, or why contractual agreements can provide a safety net for individuals with 
relatively low performance. How significant “choking” is in other environments and precisely 
through which channels it affects performance remain to be explored.  
Finally, we demonstrate that the tournament setting significantly increases risk-taking, leading 
to higher risk and lower average performance relative to a counterfactual piece-rate contract. 
Although this is likely to be optimal in a sporting contest, where spectators seek excitement and 
breathtaking performances, it may not be so desirable within firms. If firm profitability is 
affected more by average performance than by the rare exceptional performance of a few 
individuals, then tournament-like incentives may reduce overall performance and profitability. 
On the other hand, in industries in which research and development are fundamental, 
tournaments may provide workers with the optimal incentives to take risk. This may partly 
explain why contracts based on relative performance are common but not ubiquitous, and why 
they are not uniformly distributed across different types of workers, firms or industries. 
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FIGURE 1 – THE ATHLETES’ RISK-REWARD FRONTIER 
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Notes: The figure describes the risk-reward frontiers for two hypothetical athletes of different ability. The better 
athlete is characterized by the frontier located to the right. Each competitor can improve the probability of a 
successful lift by increasing the quality and intensity of training before the competition, or by having more 
concentration/determination during the game (i.e., by exerting more effort). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 – THE IMPACT OF RANK ON ANNOUNCEMENT 
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Notes: The figure reports the estimated coefficients (and the 95% confidence interval) of the binary indicators for 
athletes’ rank position in model (1). The specification includes athlete-year-competition specific fixed effects, 
country of origin, and stage of the competition fixed effects. Results are also reported in Table 2, column 5.  
  
FIGURE 3 – THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT 
-0.200
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
0.800
1.000
1.200
ra
n
k
2
ra
n
k
4
ra
n
k
6
ra
n
k
8
ra
n
k
1
0
ra
n
k
1
2
ra
n
k
1
4
ra
n
k
1
6
ra
n
k
1
8
ra
n
k
2
0
ra
n
k
2
2
ra
n
k
2
4
ra
n
k
2
6
ra
n
k
2
8
ra
n
k
3
0
ra
n
k
3
2
ra
n
k
3
4
coef. athlete-year-competition FE
95% CI
 
Notes: The figure reports the estimated coefficients (and the 95% confidence interval) of the binary indicators for 
athletes’ rank position in model (3). The specification includes athlete-year-competition specific fixed effects and 
stage of the competition fixed effects. Results are also reported in Table 3, column 5. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 – THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT IN PRESTIGIOUS AND NON-PRESTIGIOUS 
COMPETITIONS 
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 Notes: The figure describes the differences in the impact of rank on the probability of a successful lift for 
prestigious and non-prestigious competitions (and the 95% confidence interval). The impact of rank one in 
prestigious competitions is normalized to zero. The results are also reported in Table 5 (columns 1 and 2).  
 
  
FIGURE 5 – COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF A LINEAR REWARD 
SCHEME 
 
 
Notes: The figure describes the risk-reward frontier for a hypothetical athlete with average announcement and 
average probability of a successful lift in the second clean & jerk attempt (point A), based on the coefficients of 
the logit model in Table 3 and the average announcement reported in Table 1. Point B describes the optimal 
counterfactual announcement -and the corresponding probability of success- if prizes were assigned stage-by-
stage, as a linear function of the weight lifted, with no rewards based on relative performance (see Section 5). 
 
 
 
stage 1 stage 2 stage 3 stage 4 stage 5 stage 6
Announcement 122.404 125.953 128.013 150.570 154.808 156.752
36.860 37.205 37.450 44.057 44.503 44.840
Prob. of Success 0.732 0.570 0.397 0.806 0.557 0.317
0.443 0.495 0.489 0.406 0.497 0.465
TABLE 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Snatch Clean & Jerk
Notes: The table provides the average and standard deviation (in italics) of the announcement and the probability of 
success at each stage. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Announcement itjs  Announcement itjs  Announcement itjs  Announcement itjs  Announcement itjs  
Rank 2 0.252*** 0.255*** 0.258*** 0.254*** 0.309***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.079) (0.081) (0.090)
Rank 3 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.266*** 0.367*** 0.420***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.072) (0.079) (0.090)
Rank 4 0.512*** 0.522*** 0.560*** 0.616*** 0.657***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.081) (0.088) (0.099)
Rank 5 0.569*** 0.581*** 0.625*** 0.691*** 0.738***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.083) (0.090) (0.104)
Rank 6 0.656*** 0.670*** 0.720*** 0.786*** 0.825***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.086) (0.091) (0.105)
Rank 7 0.567*** 0.584*** 0.635*** 0.690*** 0.733***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.085) (0.091) (0.106)
Rank 8 0.539*** 0.558*** 0.628*** 0.697*** 0.744***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.085) (0.093) (0.107)
Rank 9 0.588*** 0.605*** 0.635*** 0.727*** 0.754***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.089) (0.095) (0.109)
Rank 10 0.521*** 0.538*** 0.558*** 0.641*** 0.666***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.089) (0.096) (0.111)
Announcementitj(s-1) 0.978*** 0.978*** 0.979*** 0.976*** 0.977***
announcement in previous 
attempt (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Successitj(s-1) 4.167*** 4.167*** 4.177*** 4.216*** 4.212***
success in previous attempt (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034)
Bodyweightitj 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018***
athlete's bodyweight in Kg (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Homeitj -0.002 -0.002 -0.017
competing in home country (0.057) (0.057) (0.080)
Number of Competitorsitjs 0.006** 0.002 0.007**
competitors at each stage (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 29593 29593 29593 29605 29605
Clusters 4052 4052 4052 4052 4052
Athlete FE yes yes
Competition FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Competition-Year FE yes
Athlete-Competition FE yes
Athlete-Year FE yes
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes
TABLE 2 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON ANNOUNCEMENT
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i , in year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the game. All equations include stage of the 
competition binary indicators. The first three columns also inlude country of origin binary indicators. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit (MLE)
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  
Rank 2 -0.039** -0.040** -0.035 0.016 0.039 0.248*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.127)
Rank 3 -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.050** 0.027 0.067** 0.391***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.137)
Rank 4 -0.079*** -0.082*** -0.051** 0.043 0.121*** 0.738***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.147)
Rank 5 -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.067*** 0.045* 0.138*** 0.857***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.157)
Rank 6 -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.036 0.084*** 0.190*** 1.130***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.161)
Rank 7 -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.017 0.109*** 0.220*** 1.296***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.164)
Rank 8 -0.053** -0.057** -0.007 0.130*** 0.248*** 1.454***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.167)
Rank 9 -0.030 -0.034 0.028 0.177*** 0.303*** 1.747***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.167)
Rank 10 -0.026 -0.029 0.034 0.185*** 0.319*** 1.836***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.168)
Announce-stage1 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.111***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Announce-stage2 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.109***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Announce-stage3 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Announce-stage4 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Announce-stage5 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.093***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Bodyweightitj 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009**
athlete's bodyweight in Kg (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Homeitj 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.072***
competing at home country (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)
Number of Competitorsitjs -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005***
competitors at each stage (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 36901 36901 36901 36915 36915 33556
Clusters 4052 4052 4052 4052 4052 3741
Athlete FE yes yes
Competition FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Competition-Year FE yes
Athlete-Competition FE yes
Athlete-Year FE yes
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes yes
TABLE 3 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL LIFT
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt by athlete i , in year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the 
game, was successful. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. The first three columns also inlude country of origin binary 
indicators. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Estimation method IV
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs  
Rank 2 0.036
(0.026)
Rank 3 0.061**
(0.027)
Rank 4 0.109***
(0.028)
Rank 5 0.114***
(0.030)
Rank 6 0.163***
(0.030)
Rank 7 0.183***
(0.030)
Rank 8 0.204***
(0.031)
Rank 9 0.250***
(0.031)
Rank 10 0.259***
(0.031)
Rank 11 0.282***
(0.031)
Rank 12 0.333***
(0.032)
Rank 13 0.335***
(0.032)
Rank 14 0.344***
(0.032)
Rank 15 0.356***
(0.033)
Rank 16 0.414***
(0.033)
Rank 17 0.420***
(0.034)
Rank 18 0.434***
(0.035)
Rank 19 0.441***
(0.037)
Rank 20 0.522***
(0.030)
Announcement itjs  -0.010***
announced weight to lift (0.001)
1
st
 Stage Coef.-Announcement itjs-1  0.978***
announcement in previous attempt (0.003)
1
st
 Stage Coef.-Success itjs-1  4.231***
success in previous attempt (0.029)
1
st
 Stage R
2
0.934
1
st
 Stage F-test 76731.31***
[0.000]
Observations 29572
Clusters 4036
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes
TABLE 4 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
A SUCCESSFUL LIFT - IV  ESTIMATION
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt by 
athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game, was successful.  The regression 
includes stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported 
in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-prestigious Prestigious Non-prestigious Prestigious
Rank 1 0.398*** 0.316*** 0.613*** 0.583***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.057)
Rank 2 0.441*** 0.306*** 0.660*** 0.576***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.043)
Rank 3 0.459*** 0.312*** 0.632*** 0.563***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.042)
Rank 4 0.471*** 0.332*** 0.634*** 0.500***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.028) (0.039)
Rank 5 0.457*** 0.347*** 0.621*** 0.531***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.029) (0.035)
Rank 6 0.508*** 0.380*** 0.662*** 0.500***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.030) (0.037)
Rank 7 0.539*** 0.399*** 0.698*** 0.563***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.036) (0.040)
Rank 8 0.562*** 0.421*** 0.677*** 0.595***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.034) (0.039)
Rank 9 0.600*** 0.472*** 0.717*** 0.614***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.036) (0.040)
Rank 10 0.627*** 0.474*** 0.677*** 0.654***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.039) (0.037)
Rank 11 0.620*** 0.501*** 0.733*** 0.613***
(0.027) (0.018) (0.045) (0.040)
Rank 12 0.663*** 0.546*** 0.704*** 0.734***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.055) (0.041)
Rank 13 0.677*** 0.547*** 0.728*** 0.671***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.052) (0.041)
Rank 14 0.675*** 0.562*** 0.732*** 0.665***
(0.033) (0.020) (0.062) (0.046)
Rank 15 0.723*** 0.572*** 0.765*** 0.637***
(0.035) (0.021) (0.068) (0.054)
Rank 16 0.751*** 0.640*** 0.819*** 0.707***
(0.034) (0.021) (0.060) (0.049)
Rank 17 0.804*** 0.626*** 0.851*** 0.661***
(0.042) (0.023) (0.066) (0.053)
Rank 18 0.750*** 0.667*** 0.745*** 0.748***
(0.046) (0.023) (0.093) (0.059)
Rank 19 0.759*** 0.679*** 0.628*** 0.745***
(0.056) (0.025) (0.106) (0.067)
Rank 20 0.853*** 0.749*** 0.863*** 0.714***
(0.035) (0.013) (0.053) (0.026)
All athletes
Athletes participating in both types of 
competitions
Calculated Total Effects
TABLE 5 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL LIFT 
IN PRESTIGIOUS AND NON-PRESTIGIOUS COMPETITIONS
Notes: The table reports the impact of interim rank on the probability of a successful lift for the average announcement:  
δn
P
Rank(n) + (1/5)Σs (λs
P
Announcement*s+τs
P
) for each rank n, both for prestigious (P=1) and non-prestigious 
competitions (P=0), where Announcement*s is the average announcement for stage s, and τs
P
 is the estimated stage-
specific coefficient. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by 
athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
NON-CLOSE CLOSE
Rank 1 0.222*** 0.218***
(0.026) (0.033)
Rank 2 0.262*** 0.253***
(0.020) (0.032)
Rank 3 0.283*** 0.277***
(0.019) (0.026)
Rank 4 0.352*** 0.318***
(0.018) (0.021)
Rank 5 0.360*** 0.340***
(0.019) (0.020)
Rank 6 0.440*** 0.371***
(0.019) (0.020)
Rank 7 0.438*** 0.426***
(0.019) (0.019)
Rank 8 0.495*** 0.429***
(0.020) (0.020)
Rank 9 0.535*** 0.495***
(0.020) (0.020)
Rank 10 0.573*** 0.489***
(0.019) (0.020)
Rank 11 0.576*** 0.536***
(0.020) (0.022)
Rank 12 0.646*** 0.564***
(0.021) (0.023)
Rank 13 0.640*** 0.574***
(0.021) (0.024)
Rank 14 0.668*** 0.578***
(0.021) (0.026)
Rank 15 0.678*** 0.644***
(0.023) (0.026)
Rank 16 0.723*** 0.709***
(0.022) (0.031)
Rank 17 0.756*** 0.656***
(0.024) (0.034)
Rank 18 0.782*** 0.683***
(0.026) (0.034)
Rank 19 0.799*** 0.691***
(0.027) (0.036)
Rank 20 0.882*** 0.763***
(0.014) (0.020)
TABLE 6 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT IN CLOSE AND NON-CLOSE COMPETITIONS
Calculated Total Effects
Notes:  The table reports the impact of interim rank on the probability of a successful lift for the average 
announcement: δn
C
Rank(n) + (1/5)Σs (λs
C
Announcement*s+τs
C
) for each rank n, both for close (C=1) and non-close 
competitions (C=0), where Announcement*s is the average announcement for stage s, and τs
C
 is the estimated stage-
specific coefficient. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and 
clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Average Announcement Pr(successful lift) Elasticity Announcement Pr(successful lift)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
stage 1 126.0 0.57 -5.95 107.0 0.92
stage 2 128.0 0.40 -8.41 102.9 0.91
stage 3 150.6 0.81 -2.74 139.2 0.92
stage 4 154.8 0.56 -6.44 131.4 0.92
stage 5 156.8 0.32 -9.95 123.3 0.91
Estimated Counterfactual valuesObserved values
TABLE 7 - COUNTERFACTUAL LINEAR REWARD SCHEME
Notes: Columns 1 and 2  report the average observed announcement and probability of a successful lift at each stage.  Column 3 reports the estimated elasticity 
of the probability of a successful lift to the announcement, computed at the average values (see Section 5  for details).  Column 4 and 5 report the 
counterfactual announcement such that the elasticity is equal to one, and the corresponding probability of a successful lift. 
Estimation method
Dependent variable
Non-experienced Experienced
Rank 2 -0.032 0.086***
(0.038) (0.031)
Rank 3 0.015 0.106***
(0.041) (0.034)
Rank 4 0.061 0.178***
(0.044) (0.034)
Rank 5 0.082* 0.201***
(0.045) (0.036)
Rank 6 0.138*** 0.252***
(0.045) (0.041)
Rank 7 0.162*** 0.315***
(0.046) (0.040)
Rank 8 0.193*** 0.343***
(0.046) (0.047)
Rank 9 0.253*** 0.390***
(0.046) (0.049)
Rank 10 0.270*** 0.404***
(0.046) (0.049)
Rank 11 0.293*** 0.492***
(0.047) (0.052)
Rank 12 0.360*** 0.422***
(0.047) (0.059)
Rank 13 0.356*** 0.505***
(0.047) (0.058)
Rank 14 0.385*** 0.403***
(0.048) (0.065)
Rank 15 0.412*** 0.529***
(0.049) (0.066)
Rank 16 0.471*** 0.565***
(0.048) (0.065)
Rank 17 0.491*** 0.388***
(0.050) (0.067)
Rank 18 0.503*** 0.570***
(0.050) (0.080)
Rank 19 0.532*** 0.471***
(0.051) (0.089)
Rank 20 0.615*** 0.615***
(0.048) (0.043)
Observations
Clusters
Athlete-Year-Competition FE
36915
4052
yes
TABLE 8 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT FOR EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED 
ATHLETES
OLS
Pr(success) itjs  
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt by athlete 
i , in year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the game, was successful. The regression includes stage of 
the competition binary indicators. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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FIGURE A1 – THE IMPACT OF RANK ON ANNOUNCEMENT 
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Notes: Figure plots the estimated coefficients on the binary indicators for the rank position of athletes from Table 
A1. The different lines on the graph correspond to the different column of Table A1, where we control for more 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A2 – THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT 
-0.200
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
0.800
1.000
ra
n
k
2
ra
n
k
4
ra
n
k
6
ra
n
k
8
ra
n
k
1
0
ra
n
k
1
2
ra
n
k
1
4
ra
n
k
1
6
ra
n
k
1
8
ra
n
k
2
0
ra
n
k
2
2
ra
n
k
2
4
ra
n
k
2
6
ra
n
k
2
8
ra
n
k
3
0
ra
n
k
3
2
ra
n
k
3
4
athlete, year, competition
athlete, year-competition
athlete-competition, year
athlete-year, competition
athlete-year-competition
 
Notes: Figure plots the estimated coefficients on the binary indicators for the rank position of athletes from Table 
A2. The different lines on the graph correspond to the different column (1-5) of Table A2, where we control for 
more sources of unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Announcement itjs Announcement itjs Announcement itjs Announcement itjs Announcement itjs
Rank 2 0.252*** 0.255*** 0.258*** 0.254*** 0.309***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.079) (0.081) (0.090)
Rank 3 0.226*** 0.234*** 0.266*** 0.367*** 0.420***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.072) (0.079) (0.090)
Rank 4 0.512*** 0.522*** 0.560*** 0.616*** 0.657***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.081) (0.088) (0.099)
Rank 5 0.569*** 0.581*** 0.625*** 0.691*** 0.738***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.083) (0.090) (0.104)
Rank 6 0.656*** 0.670*** 0.720*** 0.786*** 0.825***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.086) (0.091) (0.105)
Rank 7 0.567*** 0.584*** 0.635*** 0.690*** 0.733***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.085) (0.091) (0.106)
Rank 8 0.539*** 0.558*** 0.628*** 0.697*** 0.744***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.085) (0.093) (0.107)
Rank 9 0.588*** 0.605*** 0.635*** 0.727*** 0.754***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.089) (0.095) (0.109)
Rank 10 0.521*** 0.538*** 0.558*** 0.641*** 0.666***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.089) (0.096) (0.111)
Rank 11 0.504*** 0.522*** 0.531*** 0.602*** 0.610***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.090) (0.098) (0.112)
Rank 12 0.430*** 0.449*** 0.453*** 0.520*** 0.516***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.092) (0.101) (0.114)
Rank 13 0.493*** 0.513*** 0.509*** 0.551*** 0.546***
(0.082) (0.081) (0.094) (0.102) (0.115)
Rank 14 0.407*** 0.424*** 0.429*** 0.463*** 0.453***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.092) (0.100) (0.113)
Rank 15 0.398*** 0.414*** 0.409*** 0.442*** 0.409***
(0.087) (0.086) (0.098) (0.105) (0.118)
Rank 16 0.238*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.281*** 0.255**
(0.085) (0.085) (0.097) (0.104) (0.118)
Rank 17 0.248*** 0.262*** 0.258** 0.270** 0.216*
(0.092) (0.092) (0.103) (0.112) (0.125)
Rank 18 0.123 0.137 0.101 0.120 0.079
(0.090) (0.089) (0.102) (0.113) (0.125)
Rank 19 0.108 0.123 0.106 0.071 0.012
(0.096) (0.096) (0.108) (0.118) (0.129)
Rank 20 0.199* 0.211** 0.155 0.132 0.058
(0.106) (0.106) (0.118) (0.128) (0.140)
Rank 21 0.082 0.099 0.042 0.042 -0.028
(0.101) (0.100) (0.115) (0.123) (0.137)
Rank 22 0.053 0.068 0.051 0.063 -0.016
(0.109) (0.109) (0.121) (0.130) (0.143)
Rank 23 -0.085 -0.071 -0.113 -0.129 -0.221
(0.112) (0.112) (0.122) (0.131) (0.142)
Rank 24 0.176 0.187 0.121 0.065 -0.013
(0.118) (0.118) (0.132) (0.139) (0.150)
Rank 25 0.138 0.152 0.131 0.079 0.024
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(0.136) (0.136) (0.149) (0.156) (0.169)
Rank 26 0.058 0.072 0.007 -0.078 -0.171
(0.120) (0.120) (0.137) (0.145) (0.157)
Rank 27 0.013 0.026 -0.025 -0.101 -0.219
(0.138) (0.138) (0.149) (0.152) (0.166)
Rank 28 -0.073 -0.057 -0.049 -0.164 -0.267
(0.137) (0.136) (0.147) (0.165) (0.174)
Rank 29 -0.215 -0.203 -0.239 -0.254 -0.392**
(0.134) (0.134) (0.149) (0.161) (0.173)
Rank 30 -0.285** -0.276** -0.350** -0.353** -0.467***
(0.133) (0.134) (0.155) (0.165) (0.180)
Rank 31 -0.242 -0.232 -0.280* -0.337** -0.418**
(0.154) (0.154) (0.170) (0.167) (0.180)
Rank 32 -0.144 -0.132 -0.179 -0.239 -0.350*
(0.145) (0.146) (0.156) (0.171) (0.185)
Rank 33 -0.124 -0.116 -0.195 -0.163 -0.311
(0.168) (0.167) (0.180) (0.195) (0.198)
Rank 34 0.001 0.011 -0.043 0.010 -0.166
(0.197) (0.197) (0.216) (0.220) (0.244)
Rank 35 -0.261** -0.260** -0.396*** -0.337** -0.510***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.126) (0.135) (0.154)
Announcementitj(s-1) 0.978*** 0.978*** 0.979*** 0.976*** 0.977***
announcement in previous 
attempt (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Successitj(s-1) 4.167*** 4.167*** 4.177*** 4.216*** 4.212***
success in previous attempt (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034)
Bodyweightitj 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018***
athlete's bodyweight in Kg (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Homeitj -0.002 -0.002 -0.017
competing in home country (0.057) (0.057) (0.080)
Number of Competitorsitjs 0.006** 0.002 0.007**
competitors at each stage (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 29593 29593 29593 29605 29605
Clusters 4048 4048 4048 4048 4048
Athlete FE yes yes
Competition FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Competition-Year FE yes
Athlete-Competition FE yes
Athlete-Year FE yes
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i , in year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the game. All equations include country of 
origin and stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered 
by athlete are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit (MLE)
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  Pr(success) itjs  
Rank 2 -0.039** -0.040** -0.035 0.016 0.039 0.248*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.127)
Rank 3 -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.050** 0.027 0.067** 0.391***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.137)
Rank 4 -0.079*** -0.082*** -0.051** 0.043 0.121*** 0.738***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.147)
Rank 5 -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.067*** 0.045* 0.138*** 0.857***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.157)
Rank 6 -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.036 0.084*** 0.190*** 1.130***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.161)
Rank 7 -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.017 0.109*** 0.220*** 1.296***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.164)
Rank 8 -0.053** -0.057** -0.007 0.130*** 0.248*** 1.454***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.167)
Rank 9 -0.030 -0.034 0.028 0.177*** 0.303*** 1.747***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.167)
Rank 10 -0.026 -0.029 0.034 0.185*** 0.319*** 1.836***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.168)
Rank 11 -0.017 -0.020 0.049* 0.203*** 0.344*** 1.950***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.171)
Rank 12 0.011 0.009 0.088*** 0.248*** 0.396*** 2.239***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.173)
Rank 13 -0.006 -0.008 0.075*** 0.248*** 0.397*** 2.259***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.175)
Rank 14 0.008 0.006 0.091*** 0.260*** 0.415*** 2.364***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.179)
Rank 15 0.011 0.010 0.108*** 0.280*** 0.446*** 2.503***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.181)
Rank 16 0.066** 0.064** 0.158*** 0.336*** 0.501*** 2.812***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.183)
Rank 17 0.043 0.043 0.146*** 0.335*** 0.502*** 2.857***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.193)
Rank 18 0.051* 0.050* 0.170*** 0.355*** 0.527*** 3.008***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.195)
Rank 19 0.065** 0.065** 0.174*** 0.365*** 0.545*** 3.094***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.201)
Rank 20 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.209*** 0.393*** 0.582*** 3.296***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.209)
Rank 21 0.054* 0.054* 0.169*** 0.370*** 0.551*** 3.181***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.214)
Rank 22 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.253*** 0.455*** 0.642*** 3.660***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.221)
Rank 23 0.082** 0.084** 0.199*** 0.410*** 0.598*** 3.417***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.233)
Rank 24 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.247*** 0.467*** 0.654*** 3.732***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.232)
APPENDIX A2 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL LIFT
Rank 25 0.061 0.061 0.195*** 0.417*** 0.607*** 3.494***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.239)
Rank 26 0.098** 0.096** 0.230*** 0.455*** 0.639*** 3.658***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.244)
Rank 27 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.262*** 0.489*** 0.693*** 4.057***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.266)
Rank 28 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.270*** 0.484*** 0.697*** 3.993***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.261)
Rank 29 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.313*** 0.537*** 0.743*** 4.239***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.049) (0.051) (0.280)
Rank 30 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.309*** 0.534*** 0.742*** 4.351***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.289)
Rank 31 0.111** 0.112** 0.274*** 0.496*** 0.702*** 4.048***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.312)
Rank 32 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.350*** 0.584*** 0.786*** 4.667***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.323)
Rank 33 0.123** 0.124** 0.297*** 0.524*** 0.733*** 4.250***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.343)
Rank 34 0.254*** 0.252*** 0.403*** 0.620*** 0.833*** 4.925***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063) (0.387)
Rank 35 0.197*** 0.192*** 0.350*** 0.560*** 0.769*** 4.701***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.042) (0.044) (0.287)
Announce-stage1 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.111***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Announce-stage2 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.109***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Announce-stage3 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Announce-stage4 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Announce-stage5 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.093***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Bodyweightitj 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009**
athlete's bodyweight in Kg (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Homeitj 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.072***
competing at home country (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)
Number of Competitorsitjs -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005***
competitors at each stage (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 36901 36901 36901 36915 36915 33556
Clusters 4052 4052 4052 4052 4052 3741
Athlete FE yes yes
Competition FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Competition-Year FE yes
Athlete-Competition FE yes
Athlete-Year FE yes
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt to lift a given weight, by athlete i , in year t , in competition 
j , at stage s  of the game, was successful. All equations include country of origin and stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Estimation method OLS
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs  
Rank 2 0.041*
(0.025)
Rank 3 0.074***
(0.027)
Rank 4 0.128***
(0.027)
Rank 5 0.145***
(0.029)
Rank 6 0.198***
(0.029)
Rank 7 0.227***
(0.029)
Rank 8 0.255***
(0.030)
Rank 9 0.309***
(0.030)
Rank 10 0.323***
(0.030)
Rank 11 0.351***
(0.030)
Rank 12 0.401***
(0.031)
Rank 13 0.404***
(0.031)
Rank 14 0.425***
(0.031)
Rank 15 0.456***
(0.033)
Rank 16 0.513***
(0.032)
Rank 17 0.518***
(0.034)
Rank 18 0.543***
(0.034)
Rank 19 0.561***
(0.035)
Rank 20 0.648***
(0.030)
Observations 36915
Clusters 4052
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes
APPENDIX A3 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY 
OF A SUCCESSFUL LIFT - FLEXIBLE FUNCTIONAL FORM
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt by 
athlete i , in year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the game, was successful. Regression includes 
stage of the competition binary indicators.  We define an indicator variable for each decile of the 
distribution of announcement. Each indictor variable is then interacted with stage specific 
dummies. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form 
and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Estimation method OLS
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs  
RankChange 2 0.131**
Athletes that fell between three and six rank positions (0.057)
RankChange 3 0.209***
Athletes that fell more than six rank positions (0.048)
Observations 13754
Clusters 3146
Athlete-Year-Competition-Type of lift FE yes
APPENDIX A4 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SUCCESSFUL LIFT- ATHLETES REATTEMPTING THE SAME WEIGHT
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt by athlete i , in year t , in 
competition j , at stage s  of the game, was successful. We include in the sample only athletes reattempting the same 
weight (see Section 3.3). Regression includes stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS Logit (MLE) Logit (MLE) OLS OLS
Dependent variable Pr(success) itjs Pr(success) itjs Pr(success) itjs Pr(success) itjs Announcement itjs Announcement itjs
Rank 2 * EC 0.042 0.047 0.171 0.197 0.058 0.035
(0.032) (0.038) (0.159) (0.186) (0.114) (0.134)
Rank 3 * EC 0.062* 0.019 0.291* 0.052 0.295*** 0.317**
(0.033) (0.038) (0.160) (0.182) (0.109) (0.125)
Rank 4 * EC 0.074** 0.023 0.307* 0.025 0.527*** 0.601***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.164) (0.189) (0.121) (0.144)
Rank 5 * EC 0.060* 0.010 0.225 -0.029 0.590*** 0.525***
(0.035) (0.043) (0.172) (0.204) (0.122) (0.146)
Rank 6 * EC 0.107*** 0.046 0.438** 0.104 0.740*** 0.711***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.179) (0.217) (0.121) (0.142)
Rank 7 * EC 0.141*** 0.086* 0.634*** 0.328 0.587*** 0.585***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.183) (0.235) (0.121) (0.148)
Rank 8 * EC 0.163*** 0.063 0.726*** 0.152 0.612*** 0.601***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.181) (0.228) (0.126) (0.163)
Rank 9 * EC 0.202*** 0.104** 0.945*** 0.375 0.599*** 0.540***
(0.038) (0.049) (0.187) (0.237) (0.126) (0.162)
Rank 10 * EC 0.227*** 0.064 1.034*** 0.142 0.479*** 0.729***
(0.039) (0.052) (0.187) (0.249) (0.139) (0.201)
Rank 11 * EC 0.223*** 0.120** 1.041*** 0.437 0.337** 0.377**
(0.040) (0.057) (0.192) (0.279) (0.133) (0.181)
Rank 12 * EC 0.266*** 0.091 1.253*** 0.316 0.138 0.089
(0.040) (0.063) (0.195) (0.293) (0.142) (0.189)
Rank 13 * EC 0.278*** 0.115* 1.337*** 0.463 0.268* 0.008
(0.041) (0.063) (0.199) (0.296) (0.141) (0.202)
Rank 14 * EC 0.275*** 0.119* 1.280*** 0.441 0.162 0.117
(0.044) (0.071) (0.211) (0.333) (0.148) (0.243)
Rank 15 * EC 0.328*** 0.152** 1.511*** 0.605* 0.040 -0.039
(0.046) (0.076) (0.220) (0.339) (0.152) (0.207)
Rank 16 * EC 0.353*** 0.206*** 1.708*** 0.908*** -0.100 -0.185
(0.045) (0.069) (0.220) (0.341) (0.148) (0.192)
Rank 17 * EC 0.406*** 0.238*** 2.024*** 1.125*** -0.126 -0.082
(0.051) (0.073) (0.258) (0.366) (0.174) (0.260)
Rank 18 * EC 0.352*** 0.132 1.682*** 0.516 -0.414** -0.480*
(0.054) (0.099) (0.269) (0.462) (0.176) (0.252)
Rank 19 * EC 0.361*** 0.015 1.716*** -0.105 -0.414** -0.700**
(0.063) (0.113) (0.307) (0.519) (0.190) (0.271)
Rank 20 * EC 0.455*** 0.250*** 2.216*** 1.084*** -0.463*** -0.443*
(0.046) (0.064) (0.239) (0.311) (0.165) (0.228)
Rank 1 * no EC -0.272*** -0.222** -1.368*** -0.977** -0.095 -0.122
(0.070) (0.098) (0.331) (0.442) (0.191) (0.234)
Rank 2 * no EC -0.278*** -0.228** -1.418*** -1.039** 0.326* 0.134
(0.070) (0.100) (0.327) (0.447) (0.179) (0.210)
Rank 3 * no EC -0.275*** -0.240** -1.425*** -1.131*** 0.350** 0.150
(0.068) (0.095) (0.318) (0.423) (0.174) (0.195)
APPENDIX A5 - RISK TAKING AND PERFORMANCE IN PRESTIGIOUS AND NON-PRESTIGIOUS 
COMPETITIONS
Rank 4 * no EC -0.256*** -0.306*** -1.282*** -1.427*** 0.624*** 0.739***
(0.068) (0.096) (0.316) (0.426) (0.173) (0.206)
Rank 5 * no EC -0.240*** -0.273*** -1.200*** -1.272*** 0.711*** 0.665***
(0.067) (0.092) (0.312) (0.408) (0.170) (0.200)
Rank 6 * no EC -0.207*** -0.303*** -1.048*** -1.423*** 0.775*** 0.778***
(0.068) (0.097) (0.314) (0.432) (0.171) (0.205)
Rank 7 * no EC -0.188*** -0.247** -0.956*** -1.155*** 0.713*** 0.708***
(0.068) (0.096) (0.312) (0.423) (0.175) (0.202)
Rank 8 * no EC -0.166** -0.208** -0.823*** -0.998** 0.707*** 0.682***
(0.068) (0.096) (0.316) (0.428) (0.170) (0.198)
Rank 9 * no EC -0.113* -0.191* -0.588* -0.934** 0.760*** 0.617***
(0.068) (0.097) (0.314) (0.432) (0.171) (0.199)
Rank 10 * no EC -0.116* -0.153 -0.602* -0.717* 0.690*** 0.576***
(0.068) (0.096) (0.312) (0.427) (0.170) (0.201)
Rank 11 * no EC -0.084 -0.192* -0.461 -0.955** 0.706*** 0.713***
(0.068) (0.099) (0.316) (0.439) (0.172) (0.215)
Rank 12 * no EC -0.039 -0.068 -0.233 -0.350 0.675*** 0.584***
(0.069) (0.101) (0.320) (0.450) (0.171) (0.217)
Rank 13 * no EC -0.043 -0.134 -0.250 -0.662 0.654*** 0.703***
(0.069) (0.102) (0.319) (0.448) (0.172) (0.225)
Rank 14 * no EC -0.023 -0.139 -0.126 -0.706 0.570*** 0.529**
(0.069) (0.100) (0.318) (0.445) (0.169) (0.206)
Rank 15 * no EC -0.016 -0.166 -0.127 -0.844* 0.585*** 0.597**
(0.070) (0.108) (0.322) (0.482) (0.171) (0.252)
Rank 16 * no EC 0.054 -0.104 0.216 -0.518 0.408** 0.210
(0.070) (0.106) (0.322) (0.472) (0.173) (0.251)
Rank 17 * no EC 0.038 -0.139 0.178 -0.690 0.394** 0.419*
(0.070) (0.106) (0.323) (0.474) (0.176) (0.243)
Rank 18 * no EC 0.081 -0.057 0.389 -0.311 0.272 0.304
(0.070) (0.105) (0.326) (0.473) (0.183) (0.246)
Rank 19 * no EC 0.092 -0.060 0.429 -0.294 0.206 0.562**
(0.071) (0.112) (0.330) (0.494) (0.183) (0.260)
Rank 20 * no EC 0.163** -0.091 0.783** -0.483 0.077 0.165
(0.067) (0.093) (0.312) (0.412) (0.164) (0.184)
Observations 36915 8374 34293 8289 29605 6716
Clusters 4052 584 3741 576 4048 584
Athlete-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes:  The dependent variable in the first four columns is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt by athlete i, in year t, in 
competition j, at stage s of the game, was successful. The dependent variable in the last two columns is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, 
in competition j, at stage s of the game. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. In columns 2, 4 and 6, the sample 
includes athletes who participated in the EC Championships and the World Championships (or the Olympic Games) in the same year. Standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Estimation method
Dependent variable
NON-CLOSE CLOSE
Rank 1 0.073
(0.056)
Rank 2 0.042 0.097
(0.027) (0.061)
Rank 3 0.064** 0.142**
(0.030) (0.058)
Rank 4 0.133*** 0.170***
(0.031) (0.058)
Rank 5 0.141*** 0.201***
(0.033) (0.058)
Rank 6 0.220*** 0.228***
(0.033) (0.059)
Rank 7 0.220*** 0.286***
(0.033) (0.059)
Rank 8 0.276*** 0.287***
(0.034) (0.059)
Rank 9 0.315*** 0.354***
(0.034) (0.058)
Rank 10 0.354*** 0.346***
(0.034) (0.059)
Rank 11 0.358*** 0.393***
(0.035) (0.060)
Rank 12 0.427*** 0.424***
(0.035) (0.061)
Rank 13 0.421*** 0.431***
(0.035) (0.061)
Rank 14 0.447*** 0.434***
(0.036) (0.062)
Rank 15 0.459*** 0.499***
(0.037) (0.063)
Rank 16 0.506*** 0.567***
(0.036) (0.064)
Rank 17 0.535*** 0.519***
(0.038) (0.066)
Rank 18 0.563*** 0.533***
(0.038) (0.066)
Rank 19 0.580*** 0.554***
(0.040) (0.067)
Rank 20 0.663*** 0.621***
(0.032) (0.060)
Observations
Clusters
Athlete-Year-Competition FE
36915
4052
yes
APPENDIX A6 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON THE PROBABILITY 
OF A SUCCESSFUL LIFT IN CLOSE AND NON-CLOSE 
COMPETITIONS
OLS
Pr(success) itjs  
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the attempt by athlete i , in 
year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the game, was successful.  The regression includes stage of the 
competition binary indicators. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Estimation method OLS
Dependent variable Announcement itjs  
CF 0.212***
the competitor in front is close, the competitor behind is far (0.067)
FC -0.219***
the competitor in front is far, the competitor behind close (0.064)
FF 0.192
the competitor in front is far, the competitor behind is far (0.207)
Rank 2 0.313***
(0.090)
Rank 3 0.425***
(0.091)
Rank 4 0.671***
(0.100)
Rank 5 0.762***
(0.105)
Rank 6 0.843***
(0.106)
Rank 7 0.758***
(0.106)
Rank 8 0.773***
(0.107)
Rank 9 0.782***
(0.110)
Rank 10 0.696***
(0.111)
Rank 11 0.655***
(0.113)
Rank 12 0.562***
(0.115)
Rank 13 0.585***
(0.115)
Rank 14 0.491***
(0.114)
Rank 15 0.453***
(0.119)
Rank 16 0.299**
(0.119)
Rank 17 0.262**
(0.125)
Rank 18 0.121
(0.126)
Rank 19 0.054
(0.130)
Rank 20 0.108
APPENDIX A7 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON ANNOUNCEMENT
(0.141)
Rank 21 0.020
(0.138)
Rank 22 0.024
(0.144)
Rank 23 -0.186
(0.143)
Rank 24 0.055
(0.151)
Rank 25 0.056
(0.171)
Rank 26 -0.147
(0.157)
Rank 27 -0.194
(0.167)
Rank 28 -0.252
(0.174)
Rank 29 -0.321*
(0.173)
Rank 30 -0.418**
(0.180)
Rank 31 -0.382**
(0.182)
Rank 32 -0.325*
(0.186)
Rank 33 -0.269
(0.198)
Rank 34 -0.101
(0.250)
Rank 35 -0.478***
(0.154)
Announcementitj(s-1) 0.977***
announcement in previous attempt (0.003)
Successitj(s-1) 4.204***
success in previous attempt (0.034)
Observations 29605
Clusters 4048
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i , in year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the game. 
The regression includes stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
(5)
Estimation method OLS
Dependent variable Announcement itjs  
Close Competition -0.040
Dummy = 1 if at least 30 percent of the competitors have an 
interim score that is not more than 10 points above or below 
athlete i
(0.029)
Rank 2 0.305***
(0.090)
Rank 3 0.419***
(0.090)
Rank 4 0.658***
(0.099)
Rank 5 0.742***
(0.104)
Rank 6 0.829***
(0.106)
Rank 7 0.739***
(0.106)
Rank 8 0.750***
(0.107)
Rank 9 0.758***
(0.110)
Rank 10 0.671***
(0.111)
Rank 11 0.614***
(0.113)
Rank 12 0.520***
(0.115)
Rank 13 0.549***
(0.115)
Rank 14 0.456***
(0.113)
Rank 15 0.412***
(0.119)
Rank 16 0.257**
(0.118)
Rank 17 0.218*
(0.125)
Rank 18 0.082
(0.125)
Rank 19 0.014
(0.129)
Rank 20 0.060
APPENDIX A8 - THE IMPACT OF RANK ON ANNOUNCEMENT IN CLOSE 
AND NON-CLOSE COMPETITIONS
(0.140)
Rank 21 -0.026
(0.137)
Rank 22 -0.015
(0.143)
Rank 23 -0.222
(0.142)
Rank 24 -0.013
(0.150)
Rank 25 0.024
(0.169)
Rank 26 -0.170
(0.157)
Rank 27 -0.219
(0.166)
Rank 28 -0.269
(0.173)
Rank 29 -0.395**
(0.173)
Rank 30 -0.470***
(0.179)
Rank 31 -0.424**
(0.179)
Rank 32 -0.355*
(0.184)
Rank 33 -0.315
(0.198)
Rank 34 -0.170
(0.243)
Rank 35 -0.513***
(0.154)
Announcementitj(s-1) 0.977***
announcement in previous attempt (0.003)
Successitj(s-1) 4.214***
success in previous attempt (0.034)
Observations 29605
Clusters 4048
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i , in year t , in competition j , at stage s  of the 
game. All equations include country of origin and stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by athlete are reported in 
parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
EC WC OG EC WC OG
1990
1991 1991
1992
1993 1993
1994 1994
1995 1995 1995
1996 1996 1996
1997 1997 1997 1997
1998 1998 1998 1998
1999 1999 1999 1999
2000 2000 2000 2000
2001 2001 2001 2001
2002 2002 2002 2002
2003 2003 2003 2003
2004 2004 2004 2004
2005 2005 2005 2005
2006 2006 2006 2006
MEN WOMEN
APPENDIX B1 - CHRONOLOGY OF THE 
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